The Threat of Deepfakes in Litigation: Raising the Authentication Bar to Combat Falsehood by McPeak, Agnieszka
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law 
Volume 23 
Issue 2 Issue 2 Article 5 
2-2021 
The Threat of Deepfakes in Litigation: Raising the Authentication 
Bar to Combat Falsehood 
Agnieszka McPeak 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Agnieszka McPeak, The Threat of Deepfakes in Litigation: Raising the Authentication Bar to Combat 
Falsehood, 23 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law (2021) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/vol23/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law by an authorized editor of 
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
 
433 
The Threat of Deepfakes in  
Litigation: Raising the Authentication 
Bar to Combat Falsehood 
Agnieszka McPeak* 
ABSTRACT 
Deepfakes are all over the internet—from shape-shifting 
comedians and incoherent politicians to disturbingly realistic fake 
pornography. Emerging technology makes it easier than ever to create a 
convincing deepfake. What used to take significant time and money to 
develop is now widely available, often for free, thanks to rapid advances 
in deepfake technology. 
Deepfakes threaten individual rights and even democracy. But 
their impact on litigation should not be overlooked. The US adversarial 
system of justice is built on a foundation of seeking out the truth to arrive 
at a just result. The Federal Rules of Evidence serve as an important 
framework for this truth-seeking mission, and the authentication rules, 
in particular, should play a key role in preventing deepfake evidence 
from corrupting the legal process. 
This Article looks at the unique threat of deepfakes and how the 
authentication rules under the Federal Rules of Evidence can adapt  
to help deal with these new challenges. It examines authentication 
standards that have emerged for social media evidence and suggests a 
middle-ground approach that redefines the quantity and quality of 
circumstantial evidence necessary for a reasonable jury to determine 
authenticity in the age of deepfakes. This middle-ground approach may 
raise the evidentiary bar in some cases, but it seeks to balance efficiency 
with the need to combat falsehood in the litigation process. 
 
 * Agnieszka McPeak, Associate Professor, Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, and 
Director of the Center for Law, Ethics, and Commerce at Gonzaga University School of Law. Thank 
you to the editors of the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law for their  
expertise, careful edits, and compassion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The US adversarial system of justice is built on a foundation of 
seeking out the truth to arrive at a just result. In both civil and criminal 
cases, the Federal Rules of Evidence serve as a final gatekeeper to 
funnel potential evidence to that which is relevant, authentic, and not 
unfairly prejudicial.1 The Federal Rules of Evidence have always  
had to grapple with keeping out false information, from forgeries to 
photoshop.2 Deepfakes, however, are emerging as a new, sophisticated 
form of realistic-seeming fabrications. Deepfake technology is rapidly 
improving in accuracy, speed, and volume. Doctored images that 
formerly required significant time and money to create can now be 
made in moments on a smartphone app by almost anyone.3 As deepfake 
technology rapidly advances, the naked eye will eventually be unable to 
discern the subtle clues that indicate an image, video, or audio clip is 
fake. Even experts struggle with ascertaining the veracity of a potential 
deepfake.4 While videos and audio remain powerful pieces of evidence, 
their authenticity will be hard to gauge in the era of deepfakes. 
 
 1. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 101; FED. R. EVID. 102; FED. R. EVID. 401; FED. R. EVID.  
403; FED. R. EVID. 901. 
 2. See Zachariah B. Parry, Digital Manipulation and Photographic Evidence: Defrauding 
the Courts One Thousand Words at a Time, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 175, 178–79 (2009). 
 3. See Robert Chesney & Danielle K. Citron, Disinformation on Steroids, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/deep-fake-disinformation-steroids 
[https://perma.cc/D8U6-NVKX]; see, e.g., Anya Zhukova, 7 Best Deepfake Apps and Websites, 
ONLINE TECH TIPS (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.online-tech-tips.com/cool-websites/7-best-deep-
fake-apps-and-websites/ [https://perma.cc/52WZ-RZ9M]. 
 4. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 3; see also Drew Harwell, Top AI Researchers Race 
to Detect ‘Deepfake’ Videos: ‘We Are Outgunned,’ WASH. POST (June 12, 2019, 4:44 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/12/top-ai-researchers-race-detect-deepfake-
videos-we-are-outgunned/ [https://perma.cc/2V2V-SVMK].  
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This Article explores the potential impact of deepfakes on the 
litigation process. It first discusses why deepfakes pose a new and 
unique threat in litigation and analyzes how the Federal Rules of 
Evidence attempt to weed out fake content, particularly as to the 
authentication of social media evidence. It concludes that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence are generally equipped to handle deepfakes as a new 
frontier of false evidence, but a higher bar for authentication should  
be considered in many cases. However, an across-the-board high 
evidentiary bar may not be warranted, especially in light of cost and 
efficiency concerns. This Article thus recommends that a middle-ground 
approach should be used to provide for both flexibility and adequate 
information to allow a reasonable jury to better gauge the authenticity 
of potential deepfake evidence.  
II. THE UNIQUE THREAT OF DEEPFAKES   
With its seemingly endless capacity for creativity, the internet 
has produced some hilariously realistic celebrity deepfakes. Comedian 
Bill Hader shape-shifts to take on the faces of the famous actors he is 
mimicking during a David Letterman interview.5 Former President 
Barack Obama gives an obscenity-laced speech about the threat of 
misinformation to democracy and ends with the plea to “stay woke, 
bitches.”6 Viral videos of cute babies are doctored to show Elon Musk’s 
face superimposed on the baby’s face, leading to predictably creepy 
results.7 A search for Nicholas Cage on Reddit produces countless 
videos of his face added to clips of famous films in which he never 
starred.8  
 
 5. Jon Blistein, Watch Bill Hader Become Tom Cruise, Seth Rogen in Eerie Deepfake 
Video, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 13, 2019, 4:03 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-
news/bill-hader-tom-cruise-seth-rogen-deepfake-871154/ [https://perma.cc/5L99-PXD8]. 
 6. Todd Spangler, Jordan Peele Teams with BuzzFeed for Obama Fake-News Awareness 
Video (Watch), VARIETY (Apr. 17, 2018, 11:45 AM), https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/jordan-
peele-obama-fake-news-video-buzzfeed-1202755517/ [https://perma.cc/S8G8-WRR4]. The video 
was created by BuzzFeed and comedian Jordan Peele, who did the voice impersonation used in the 
video. Id. University of Washington researchers have developed an AI tool that allows them to 
easily manipulate a video of Barack Obama to swap out the speech he is giving, producing a  
realistic deepfake video. Adam Mann, Deepfake AI: Our Dystopian Present, LIVE SCI. (Sept. 30, 
2019), https://www.livescience.com/deepfake-ai.html [https://perma.cc/HU3C-XP7B]. 
 7. See Amanda Kooser, This Elon Musk Deepfake Baby Video Shattered My Brain, CNET 
(May 10, 2019, 12:23 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/this-elon-musk-deepfake-baby-video-shat-
tered-my-brain/ [https://perma.cc/QP33-PWM7]. 
 8. See Sam Haysom, People Are Using Face-Swapping Tech to Add Nicholas Cage  
to Random Movies and What Is 2018, MASHABLE (Jan. 31, 2018), https://masha-
ble.com/2018/01/31/nicolas-cage-face-swapping-deepfakes/ [https://perma.cc/KJH6-FDQM]. 
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The more disturbing reality, however, is that the vast  
majority of deepfakes are pornography.9 Female celebrity faces are 
being digitally added to pornographic content, creating deepfake  
porn videos.10 Kristen Bell,11 Scarlett Johansson,12 and Taylor Swift13  
have all been victims of deepfake pornography. But the deepfake 
pornography phenomenon is not limited to celebrities. Australian law 
graduate Noelle Martin discovered that her public social media images 
were used to create explicit photos and videos of her.14 In addition to 
the emotional trauma they endure, victims of deepfake pornography 
suffer stigmatization, reputational harm, harassment, and even 
blackmail.15 Women who are victims of abusive deepfake pornography 
already know the serious impact deepfake technology can have on 
individual lives. 
The threat of deepfakes is amplified by their accuracy,  
ease of creation, and impact on viewers. Deepfakes are created  
using artificial intelligence and deep-learning technology.16 These  
deepfake applications use real images, audio, and video to generate  
 
 9. Cleo Abram, The Most Urgent Threat of Deepfakes Isn’t Politics. It’s Porn., VOX (June 
8, 2020, 12:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/8/21284005/urgent-threat-deepfakes-politics-
porn-kristen-bell [https://perma.cc/3855-N8W5]. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Claudia Willen, Kristen Bell Says She Was ‘Shocked’ to Learn That Her Face Was Used 
in a Pornographic Deepfake Video, INSIDER (June 11, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.in-
sider.com/kristen-bell-face-pornographic-deepfake-video-response-2020-6 [https://perma.cc/7FW4-
Y5B6]. 
 12. Isobel Asher Hamilton, Scarlett Johansson Says Trying to Stop People Making  
Deepfake Porn Videos of Her Is a ‘Lost Cause,’ BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 31, 2018, 4:51 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/scarlett-johansson-stopping-deepfake-porn-of-me-is-a-lost-
cause-2018-12 [https://perma.cc/HE4M-S92V]. 
 13. Ian Morris, Deepfake Porn Banned by Reddit and Pornhub After Taylor Swift and 
Meghan Markle Clips Emerge Online, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2018, 4:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/ianmorris/2018/02/07/deepfake-porn-banned-by-reddit-and-pornhub-after-taylor-swift-and-
meghan-markle-clips-emerge-online/#5a32524a48ea [https://perma.cc/APX7-7CR3]. 
 14. See Daniella Scott, Deepfake Porn Nearly Ruined My Life, ELLE (June 2,  
2020), https://www.elle.com/uk/life-and-culture/a30748079/deepfake-porn/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4D27-2JDL]. 
 15. See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1891–92, 1915,  
1924–28 (2019) (explaining the harms of deepfake pornography, including how victims can be  
manipulated by perpetrators to perform certain acts or pay money to combat widespread  
dissemination of deepfakes). 
 16. Kashyap Vyas, Generative Adversarial Networks: The Tech Behind Deepfake and  
FaceApp, INTERESTING ENG’G (Aug. 12, 2019), https://interestingengineering.com/generative-ad-
versarial-networks-the-tech-behind-deepfake-and-faceapp [https://perma.cc/CAC5-AJ7T]. In  
particular, Generative Adversarial Networks, or GANs, are a form of deep learning that creates, 
or generates, unique images using data inputs. Outputs then check themselves against the  
reference data set to help improve realism and accuracy of the generated images. Id. 
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realistic-looking fakes.17 While movie studios have used sophisticated 
technology for special effects in film for years, the proliferation of 
deepfake apps, which provide easy access to sophisticated editing tools, 
makes deepfakes a new and troubling development.18 Face-swapping 
apps and fake video apps, like FakeApp, which allow an average user 
to create a realistic fake video in minutes for little or no cost, make the 
democratization of deepfakes possible.19 This technology is advancing 
quickly, prompting the quality of deepfakes to continue to increase.20 
Fewer people will be able to detect the visual or aural clues of 
deepfakes.21 Deepfake creators will need increasingly smaller data sets 
to create convincing deepfakes as deep-learning technology advances. 
At the same time, the internet spurs the swift and broad dissemination 
of this technology, and more people will have access to the tools for 
creating deepfakes.22  
The harmful impact of deepfakes also permeates politics. 
Millions of people viewed a video of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi 
appearing to slur her speech while speaking at a press conference.23 The 
video was circulated widely on social media, including through a tweet 
by President Donald Trump.24 In Malaysia, a rising-star politician was 
mired in a sex tape scandal after a video surfaced purporting to show 
him engaging in illegal homosexual activity.25 Authorities and experts, 
using facial recognition technology and other forensics, could not 
establish who actually appears in the video, and all charges were 
 
 17. See Ben Dickson, What Is a Deepfake?, PCMAG (Mar. 4, 2020), 
https://www.pcmag.com/news/what-is-a-deepfake [https://perma.cc/SF9M-9HTA]. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Kevin Reilly & Steve Kovach, Face-Swapping Videos Could Lead to More ‘Fake 
News,’ BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 13, 2018, 2:14 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/fakeapp-lets-peo-
ple-make-fake-videos-deepfakes-2018-4 [https://perma.cc/7JW4-KW2G]. 
 20. Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Detecting Deepfakes, TECHSHOW, 
https://www.techshow.com/2020/01/detecting-deepfakes/ [https://perma.cc/JC5C-D9S5] (last  
visited Dec. 7, 2020). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Reilly & Kovach, supra note 19. 
 23. Jason Abbruzzese, Doctored Pelosi Videos Offer a Warning: The Internet Isn’t Ready 
for 2020, NBC NEWS (May 24, 2019, 1:56 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/doctored-
pelosi-videos-offer-warning-internet-isn-t-ready-2020-n1010011 [https://perma.cc/WU4Y-HYNV]. 
 24. Russell Berman, For Nancy Pelosi, This Is All Just Déjà Vu, ATLANTIC  
(May 24, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/05/trump-pelosi-video/590233/ 
[https://perma.cc/C2LR-KES9]. That video was a “shallow fake” that did not rely on deep-learning 
technology; instead, it involved slowing down the speed of the original and manipulating the audio 
so that the pitch of the voice remains realistic. See Abbruzzese, supra note 23. 
 25. Jarni Blakkarly, A Gay Sex Tape Is Threatening to End the Political Careers of Two 
Men in Malaysia, SBS NEWS, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/a-gay-sex-tape-is-threatening-to-end-
the-political-careers-of-two-men-in-malaysia [https://perma.cc/KN2J-ZAX2] (last updated June 
17, 2019). 
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dropped.26 Nonetheless, the video scandal caused significant political 
fallout.27 As a whole, experts have warned that, if unchecked, deepfakes 
could undermine democracy by amplifying falsehoods and sowing 
discord.28 
Deepfakes have also surfaced in litigation,29 and lawyers will 
need to take their role in combatting deepfakes seriously as the law 
tries to deal with this emerging issue.30 Deepfake evidence has already 
turned up as a key issue in some cases.31 For example, a mother in a 
British court sought to use her husband’s threatening audio comments 
against him in a child custody dispute.32 Using metadata analysis, the 
husband was able to show the audio file was a fake, created using 
software that falsified his voice.33 While the fake audio file was detected 
in that case, it serves as a cautionary tale of the power of deepfakes as 
a source of false evidence.34 
In the litigation context, two aspects of deepfakes pose a 
challenge. First, deepfakes may be convincing, compelling, and difficult 
to detect. Second, people may doubt unaltered content simply  
because they know realistic deepfakes are possible. First, while the 
 
 26. Malaysia’s Attorney-General Drops Sex-Video Case; Minister Denounces Plot, REUTERS 
(Jan. 9, 2020, 4:33 AM), https://fr.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-politics-idUSKBN1Z817V 
[https://perma.cc/PF4X-2DW3]; see also A. Ananthalakshmi, Malaysian Police Say Political Leader 
Behind Gay Sex Tape Allegations, REUTERS (July 17, 2019, 1:54 AM), https://www.reuters.com/ar-
ticle/us-malaysia-politics/malaysian-police-say-political-leader-behind-gay-sex-tape-allegations-
idUSKCN1UD0OF [https://perma.cc/3RW6-G9GB] (noting that the video appears to be authentic, 
but facial recognition could not confirm the identity of all parties). 
 27. See Ananthalakshmi, supra note 26; see also Blakkarly, supra note 25. 
 28. See Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, 
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753, 1769, 1777 (2019) (noting how deepfakes 
have beneficial applications in education, art, and autonomy); Chesney & Citron, supra note 3  
(describing the foreign policy implications of deepfakes). 
 29. See Matt Reynolds, The Judicial System Needs to Learn How to Combat the Threat of 
‘Deepfake’ Evidence, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Feb. 28, 2020, 5:11 PM), https://www.abajour-
nal.com/news/article/aba-techshow-experts-warn-of-deepfake-threats-to-justice-system 
[https://perma.cc/HQ8Z-44SJ]. 
 30. See Jason Tashea, As Deepfakes Make It Harder to Discern Truth, Lawyers Can Be 
Gatekeepers, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Feb. 26, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/lawscrib-
bler/article/as-deepfakes-make-it-harder-to-discern-truth-lawyers-can-be-gatekeepers 
[https://perma.cc/54CY-NNXP]. 
 31. See Matt Reynolds, Courts and Lawyers Struggle with Growing Prevalence of  
Deepfakes, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (June 9, 2020, 10:29 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/web/arti-
cle/courts-and-lawyers-struggle-with-growing-prevalence-of-deepfakes [https://perma.cc/7ALF-
PKVW]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. 
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democratization of deepfakes has its upsides,35 it also brings about a 
new and troubling era of disinformation. In the free speech context, the 
general approach has been to assume that the cure for false speech is 
more speech.36 But the flood of information online—real, fake, or in 
between—has shown that individuals are not necessarily able to  
access counterspeech or otherwise meaningfully seek out the truth.37 
Similarly, in the context of jurors, deepfakes may soon go beyond  
a layperson’s ability to visually ascertain whether an image or  
video purports to be what it seems.38 Second, the proliferation of 
disinformation makes people question their ability to trust anything. 
Social media disinformation has already made it harder for people to 
distinguish truth from fiction online.39 Thus, in addition to the risk of 
deepfakes being perceived as real, the knowledge that deepfakes are out 
there undermines belief in the authenticity of undoctored images. In 
other words, people no longer believe anything is real.40  
Many people value visual perception above other indicators of 
truth.41 Images are powerful, and social media has further elevated 
videos and images as sources of factual information. More Americans 
get their news from social media than print media.42 With Instagram, 
TikTok, and other video- and photo-heavy platforms gaining market 
share, social media trends continue to elevate visual content—and 
 
 35. See Jessica Silbey & Woodrow Hartzog, The Upside of Deep Fakes, 78 MD. L. REV. 960, 
960 (2019). Notably, the democratization of deepfakes has its upsides, like education, accessibility, 
and freedom of expression. Id. at 960–61; see also Chesney & Citron, supra note 28, at 1769 (noting 
how deepfakes have beneficial applications in education, art, and autonomy). 
 36. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First  
Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 822 (2010) (noting how the rational audience and 
concept of counterspeech remain important in First-Amendment jurisprudence). 
 37. See generally Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 461 (2008) (noting 
how the US system clings to the jury’s role as judge of credibility despite technological  
advances); John Villasenor, Artificial Intelligence, Deepfakes, and the Uncertain Future of Truth, 
BROOKINGS (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/02/14/artificial-intelli-
gence-deepfakes-and-the-uncertain-future-of-truth/ [https://perma.cc/WC89-W73R].  
 38. See Villasenor, supra note 37 (noting the need for public awareness about deepfakes). 
 39. See Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Truth and Misinformation Online, 
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/10/19/the-future-of-
truth-and-misinformation-online/ [https://perma.cc/VH2F-M23Q]. 
 40. See Riana Pfefferkorn, ‘Deepfakes’: A New Challenge for Trial Courts, NWSIDEBAR 
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://nwsidebar.wsba.org/2019/03/13/deepfakes-a-new-challenge-for-trial-
courts/ [https://perma.cc/A8WL-N2WV]. 
 41. See Carolyn Purnell, Do We All Still Agree that “Seeing Is Believing”?, PSYCH. TODAY 
(June 23, 2020), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/making-sense/202006/do-we-all-still-
agree-seeing-is-believing [https://perma.cc/GK2H-B7Q7]. 
 42. Elisa Shearer, Social Media Outpaces Print Newspapers in the U.S. as a News Source, 
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/social-media-
outpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/ [https://perma.cc/5B94-6B46]. 
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videos in particular—over other formats.43 But social media also has 
become fertile ground for the spread of deepfakes.44 And, as the public 
becomes more aware of the risk of being fooled by realistic deepfakes, 
they also begin to mistrust authentic videos too. Take, for example, a 
video of Gabon’s president Ali Bongo. Bongo, who suffered a stroke and 
was out of the public eye for months, was rumored to be very ill or 
dead.45 The video, meant to quash public fears, was attacked as a 
deepfake that further confirmed speculation about his poor health.46 
Controversy over the video even led to an unsuccessful military coup.47 
To date, speculation continues about whether the video was a deepfake, 
but the uncertainty and mistrust it spawned serve as a cautionary  
tale about the public’s inability to gauge authenticity in the age of 
deepfakes.48 New technology allows deepfakes to become even trickier 
to detect. Seeing is no longer believing, and viewers may now question 
even real content.49  
III. DEEPFAKES & THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
In litigation, deepfakes threaten to undermine the court’s  
fact-finding mission. First, if a deepfake is admitted as authentic 
evidence, it can undermine the court’s truth-seeking mission. 
Deepfakes can easily become outcome determinative, given that video 
evidence in the courtroom is impactful and can profoundly influence 
individual perception of events.50 Second, deepfakes also undermine the 
public’s ability to trust authentic videos. Judges and juries may be 
skeptical of believing what they see in a real, undoctored video because 
they know images are now easily manipulated. In other words, the 
knowledge that deepfakes are out there and hard to spot may make  
fact-finders question whether they can even believe real footage. 
Fortunately, proper use of the authentication rules in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence can alleviate both concerns. The key, as  
 
 43. See Deep Patel, 12 Social Media Trends to Watch in 2020, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 20, 
2019), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/343863 [https://perma.cc/7ZKR-MV89]. 
 44. See, e.g., Ali Breland, The Bizarre and Terrifying Case of the “Deepfake” Video That 
Helped Bring an African Nation to the Brink, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.moth-
erjones.com/politics/2019/03/deepfake-gabon-ali-bongo/ [https://perma.cc/9VSS-FD8G].  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Janosch Delcker, Welcome to the Age of Uncertainty, POLITICO (Dec. 17, 2019, 7:50 
PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/deepfake-videos-the-future-uncertainty/ [https://perma.cc/ 
LSD5-RXB3]. 
 49. Purnell, supra note 41; see also Chesney & Citron, supra note 28, at 1785. 
 50. See Purnell, supra note 41. 
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this Article will demonstrate, is to employ a sufficient standard of 
authenticity under Federal Rule of Evidence 901. 
A. How the Federal Rules of Evidence Weed Out Fakes 
The purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is “to administer 
every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the 
truth and securing a just determination.”51 They embody the principle 
that an adversarial system of justice is the ideal mechanism for 
reaching the truth through litigation. The proponent of evidence bears 
the burden to establish relevance and authenticity.52 Other limitations 
also apply, such as to hearsay evidence and the balancing of the 
evidence’s probative value with unfair prejudice.53 But even disputed 
evidence may be admissible, as opposing parties can present competing 
evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and otherwise seek out the truth 
throughout the litigation process. It is then for an impartial judge or 
jury, considering all the evidence, to decide the truth. 
One of the fundamental underpinnings of the US legal system is 
that a jury of the litigants’ peers is best equipped to find the truth  
based on the evidence presented. Unfortunately, individuals may now  
have a harder time detecting truth from lies online,54 and deepfakes  
further challenge the jury’s ability to perform its truth-seeking role. 
Authentication requirements, thus, must serve as a crucial roadblock 
to the use of deepfakes in litigation.  
1. Authentication of Electronically Stored Information 
With the advent of electronically stored information (ESI), 
courts had to consider whether existing admissibility rules were 
sufficient to address ESI as a new category of potential evidence. In 
Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co.,55 the US District Court for 
 
 51. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 52. FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (requiring that the proponent of the evidence show that the  
evidence is what it purports to be); FED. R. EVID. 401 (requiring that evidence must have the  
tendency to make some fact that is of consequence to the litigation more or less probable). 
 53. FED. R. EVID. 403; FED. R. EVID. 801; FED. R. EVID. 802. Hearsay is defined in Federal 
Rule of Evidence 801, FED. R. EVID. 801, with exceptions spelled out in subsequent rules, FED. R. 
EVID. 802. Rule 403 contains the balancing test that allows otherwise admissible evidence to be 
excluded on the basis of unfair prejudice outweighing its probative value. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 54. See Raina Ducklow & Bud Mortenson, Why People Are Better at Lying Online than 
Telling a Lie Face-to-Face, SCI. DAILY (May 5, 2009), https://www.sciencedaily.com/re-
leases/2009/05/090503203738.htm [https://perma.cc/LP64-VCX6]. 
 55. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007). 
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the District of Maryland identified the ways in which existing 
admissibility rules apply to ESI.56 The Lorraine opinion first provides 
an overview of evidentiary hurdles that parties must cross before ESI 
can be admitted, including relevance considerations under Rule 401.57 
Additionally, relevant ESI must survive the rules prohibiting hearsay, 
the original writing rule, and the Rule 403 balancing of probative value 
against the danger of unfair prejudice.58 
Even if otherwise admissible under the Rules, ESI evidence still 
must be authentic. Authentication is outlined in Rule 901, which states 
that the proponent of evidence “must produce evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”59 
Parties may satisfy this requirement by presenting the testimony of a 
witness with knowledge60 or by using the distinctive characteristics of 
the evidence, such as “the appearance, contents, substance, internal 
patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together 
with all the circumstances.”61 Authentication can also be established 
with evidence of a process or system, by showing that it “produces  
an accurate result.”62 For authentication of voice audio, Rule  
901(b)(5) requires “[a]n opinion identifying a person’s voice—whether 
heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or 
 
 56. Id. at 541; see also Paul W. Grimm, Michael V. Ziccardi & Alexander W. Major, Back 
to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co. and New Findings on the Admissibility 
of Electronically Stored Information, 42 AKRON L. REV. 357, 362–63 (2009). 
 57. Lorraine, 242 F.R.D. at 538 (describing the first two admissibility steps as “(1) is the 
ESI relevant as determined by Rule 401 (does it have any tendency to make some fact that is of 
consequence to the litigation more or less probable than it otherwise would be); (2) if relevant 
under 401, is it authentic as required by Rule 901(a) (can the proponent show that the ESI is what 
it purports to be)”).   
 58. Id. (describing the remaining admissibility steps as “(3) if the ESI is offered for its 
substantive truth, is it hearsay as defined by Rule 801, and if so, is it covered by an applicable 
exception (Rules 803, 804 and 807); (4) is the form of the ESI that is being offered as evidence an 
original or duplicate under the original writing rule, or if not, is there admissible secondary  
evidence to prove the content of the ESI (Rules 1001-1008); and (5) is the probative value of the 
ESI substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or one of the other factors identified 
by Rule 403, such that it should be excluded despite its relevance.”). 
 59. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). Notably, Rule 104 also addresses preliminary matters more 
broadly and allows admission of evidence to occur in two ways. FED. R. EVID. 104. First, the court 
can make the preliminary decision as to whether evidence is admissible. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
Under this path, the court “is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.” Id. The 
second path derives from Rule 104(b): “Relevance that Depends on a Fact.” FED. R. EVID. 104(b). 
Under this path, the fact-finder must be presented with evidence to support that a particular fact 
exists, and that evidence must be admissible. Id. Of these two paths, it is Rule 104(b)’s “relevance 
that depends on a fact” that often applies to authenticity determinations. See Grimm et al., supra 
note 56, at 364. 
 60. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1). 
 61. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4). 
 62. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9). 
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recording—based on hearing the voice at any time under circumstances 
that connect it with the alleged speaker.”63 Proper authentication of 
digital videos or photographs may require detailed evidence about chain 
of custody, such as how illegal pornographic content was retrieved  
from a defendant’s computer and subsequently stored.64 Testimony of 
someone who accessed content from the internet is insufficient to 
attribute content to a particular user, without “personal knowledge of 
who maintains the website, who authored the documents, or the 
accuracy of their contents.”65 
The threshold for making a prima facie showing of authenticity 
is not high, however, and it suffices to merely offer “a foundation from 
which a jury could reasonably find that the evidence is what the 
proponent says it is.”66 This burden is slight.67 Ultimately, the 
proponent of digital evidence can usually authenticate that evidence 
with other admissible evidence supporting its genuineness.68 This basic 
approach continues to be used for digital evidence as well. 
While courts have been able to apply the existing Federal  
Rules of Evidence to ESI, the rise of deepfakes marks a new era of  
altered and fabricated evidence, and a higher bar may be necessary.69  
The technology to create deepfakes will continue to outpace the 
knowledge and ability of judges, lawyers, and laypeople alike.70 A 
greater responsibility will fall on lawyers to challenge evidence that is 
a deepfake. Further, because the proponent of the evidence bears the 
burden of establishing authenticity, litigants will have to contend with 
their own attempts to rely on favorable evidence that may be difficult 
 
 63. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5). 
 64. See United States v. Salcido, 506 F.3d 729, 733 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the  
government properly authenticated child pornography taken off of the defendant’s computer by 
presenting detailed evidence as to the chain of custody, specifically how the images were retrieved 
from the defendant’s computers). 
 65. Wady v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002). 
 66. United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting 5 FEDERAL 
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 901.02[1] (2020)) (discussing authentication of emails). 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1404 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he burden of 
proof for authentication is slight.”). 
 68. See Daniel Capra, Authenticating Digital Evidence, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 3 (2017). 
 69. Cf. Grimm et al., supra note 56, at 366. (“As electronic evidence becomes more  
ubiquitous at trial, it is critical for courts to start demanding that counsel give more in terms of 
authentication—and counsel who fail to meet courts' expectations will do so at their own peril.”). 
 70. Cf. id. (“But it is also a very real possibility that someone inept with computers may 
also alter electronic evidence so as to make it unusable or inadmissible. Therefore, as technology 
continues creating relevant evidence while, simultaneously, outpacing the working knowledge and 
ability of most lawyers and judges to deal with it, ensuring proper authentication of electronic 
evidence becomes a greater responsibility for attorneys and judges alike.”). 
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to prove is real. For example, in 2002, the US Supreme Court in 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition considered the constitutionality of an 
anti-child pornography statute that attempted to prohibit images that 
merely “appear to be” or “convey the impression of” a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.71 When arguing in favor of the statute,  
the government emphasized the challenges of proving a pornographic 
image contains a real person and is not a fake.72 The statute thereby 
contemplates banning both real and virtual pornography: “As imaging 
technology improves, Congress found, it becomes more difficult to prove 
that a particular picture was produced using actual children. To ensure 
that defendants possessing child pornography using real minors  
cannot evade prosecution, Congress extended the ban to virtual child 
pornography.”73 Nonetheless, the Court held that the statute was 
overbroad and unconstitutional because it attempted to ban material 
that was neither obscene under the law nor exploiting real children.74  
While courts have found ways to apply the existing evidence 
rules to ESI generally, deepfakes pose a new and complicated challenge 
to the authentication process. The relatively low bar for authentication 
may be insufficient as deepfakes continue to rise in prominence. Social 
media content, in particular, has forced more scrutiny on the sufficiency 
of current authentication rules. 
2. Authentication of Social Media Evidence 
Because deepfakes are often obtained and shared on social 
media, a look at the authentication standards for social media  
evidence is instructive. Over the last decade, courts have taken differing 
approaches to social media evidence authentication. Some jurisdictions, 
like Maryland, have created a higher bar for authenticating social 
media content.75 Others, like Texas, have treated social media  
evidence the same as any other content, thus requiring less proof of 
authenticity.76 
Under the higher-bar Maryland approach, courts have noted  
the ease with which false information can be created through  
fictitious accounts or unauthorized access to real accounts.77 While 
 
 71. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242–43 (2002). 
 72. See id. at 242.  
 73. See id.  
 74. See id. at 256–58. 
 75. See Brendan W. Hogan, Note, Griffin v. State: Setting the Bar Too High for  
Authenticating Social Media Evidence, 71 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 61, 61 (2012). 
 76. See Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
 77. See Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 421 (Md. 2011). 
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circumstantial evidence about “distinctive characteristics” of the 
evidence sometimes suffices for authenticity for other types of evidence, 
social media evidence cannot be authenticated merely by the name and 
biographical details of the account holder.78 Rather, courts have 
enumerated three methods of authenticating social media evidence. 
First, a witness with requisite knowledge can testify that the social 
media evidence is what it claims to be.79 Second, an expert can perform 
computer forensic searches of the device used to create the content to 
identify where the content originated.80 Third, the social media website 
itself can directly provide some evidence that links a profile to the 
person or the content to its creator.81 
Griffin v. State, which established the Maryland approach, 
involved a MySpace comment that the state attempted to authenticate 
only through the testimony of the investigator who found it online.82 
However, the state failed to get testimony of the post’s author or other 
witnesses with knowledge of its creation and thus failed to authenticate 
the evidence.83 Similar authentication issues have arisen in other 
jurisdictions. For example, in United States v. Vayner, the US Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a conviction for 
unlawful transfer of a falsified identification document after the lower 
court improperly admitted a social media page printout.84 A key issue 
during the trial was whether the defendant could be linked to the Gmail 
account that sent a forged birth certificate.85 The government presented 
a printout of a profile page from a Russian social media site akin to 
Facebook as its key piece of evidence.86 The printout contained the 
defendant’s image and a version of his name.87 It also contained a 
username for Skype, a video-messaging platform, and the Gmail 
address that matched the one that sent the forged document.88 In 
attempting to authenticate the document, the government presented 
testimony from the special agent who accessed the profile via the 
internet.89 But the government presented no evidence that the 
 
 78. See id. at 423–24. 
 79. See id. at 427.  
 80. See id. at 427–28. 
 81. See id. at 428. 
 82. Id. at 418. 
 83. Id. at 423–24. 
 84. United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 127 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 85. Id. at 132. 
 86. See id. at 128. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 128–29. 
 89. Id. at 127–28. 
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defendant created the profile, that the platform confirms user identities 
for profiles, or that the Gmail account listed in the profile belonged to 
the defendant.90 Therefore, the evidence did not establish that the 
document was genuine and was too speculative to support “a reasonable 
conclusion that this page was created by the defendant or on his 
behalf.”91 The court then held the error was not harmless, and vacated 
and remanded the case.92 
Notably, the Vayner court did not state what kind of evidence 
would have sufficed to authenticate the social media printout. Instead, 
the court merely noted that many ways exist to authenticate documents 
and no type or quantum of authentication evidence is expressly defined 
in the Federal Rules of Evidence.93 The profile page at issue was a  
key piece of evidence corroborating another witness’s story, and the 
government did not do enough to show that the defendant created the 
page or that it accurately reflected his Gmail account address.94 
By contrast, the Maryland approach ultimately creates a higher 
bar, requiring the proponent of social media evidence to prove its 
authenticity through more definitive means such as the testimony of 
the creator, a forensic expert, or the hosting platform.95 Biographical 
data on the social media site and similar characteristics are not 
distinctive enough to trigger the jury’s consideration of the factual basis 
for claimed authenticity.96 
While the Maryland approach establishes a higher bar, other 
jurisdictions, like Texas, take a more flexible approach. Texas only 
requires the party proffering the evidence to make a threshold showing 
of authenticity.97 It is then for the fact-finder to ultimately make the 
determination.98 For example, in Tienda v. Texas, the court held that 
MySpace posts were properly authenticated because the state offered a 
combination of circumstantial evidence to help establish that the posts 
were made by the defendant.99 These facts included multiple distinctive 
 
 90. Id. at 131–32. 
 91. Id. at 132. 
 92. Id. at 134–35. 
 93. Id. at 133. 
 94. Id.  
 95. See Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 427–28 (Md. 2011); see also Hogan, supra note 75, at 
79. 
 96. See Paul W. Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Melissa M. O’Toole-Loureiro,  
Authentication of Social Media Evidence, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 448 (2013) (describing cases 
that have excluded social media evidence, or evidence as to its purported authenticity, due to a 
lack of threshold showing).  
 97. See Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
 98. Id. at 638. 
 99. Id. at 645. 
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photographs of the defendant, references to specific facts and people, 
and the listing of the defendant’s email address.100 Based on these  
facts, the court held that this circumstantial evidence, taken as a  
whole, “justif[ied] admitting the evidence and submitting the ultimate 
question of authenticity to the jury.”101 
The Texas approach thus avoids elevating the standard for 
admissibility of social media evidence above the usual approach  
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The authentication of social  
media evidence is a determination based on whether there is sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the evidence is 
authentic. But courts have “historically considered admissibility of  
all documentary evidence on a continuum, in which clearly authentic 
evidence is admitted, clearly inauthentic evidence is excluded, and 
everything in between is conditionally relevant and admitted for the 
jury to determine its authenticity.”102 The Federal Rules of Evidence 
thus already function in a way that allows jurors to ascertain the 
authenticity of evidence when it is not clearly authentic or inauthentic. 
In this way, the higher bar in the Maryland approach has been 
criticized as too onerous, while the more flexible Texas approach is 
touted as sufficient even for the new developments in how we create 
and share electronic content.103  
B. Finding Middle Ground for Assessing Deepfake Evidence 
The flexible standard used by the Texas approach for 
authenticating digital evidence, and specifically social media evidence, 
presupposes that jurors will have enough circumstantial evidence to 
reasonably judge authenticity. With deepfakes, simply identifying the 
source of a video or audio and leaving jurors to use their senses to gauge 
genuineness may not suffice, particularly as deepfakes become more 
sophisticated.104 Thus, the Texas approach may prove too lenient to deal 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 647; accord People v. Valdez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 632–34 (2011). 
 102. Grimm et al., supra note 96, at 456–57 (advocating for the more flexible approach to 
social media evidence authentication). 
 103. See, e.g., Hogan, supra note 75; John Patzakis, Delaware Court Affirms Conviction 
Based on Facebook Evidence, NEXT GENERATION EDISCOVERY L. & TECH BLOG (Mar. 5, 2014, 9:45 
AM), https://blog.x1discovery.com/tag/tienda-v-state/ [https://perma.cc/Q8RW-MD5L] (stating 
that the authentication test from Tienda, the 2012 Texas Court of Criminal Appeals case, has 
become the majority view in the United States). 
 104. See Elizabeth Caldera, “Reject the Evidence of Your Eyes and Ears”: Deepfakes and the 
Law of Virtual Replicants, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 177, 189 (2019) (explaining some of the subtle 
ways deepfake content can be used, like lack of blinking by the subject, but noting that the  
technology will make it even harder to rely on visual clues in the future). 
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with the new threat of deepfakes. Something more rigorous than the 
Texas approach is necessary. 
The Maryland approach, however, may be too high a bar. For 
example, it may be inefficient to require analysis of metadata and the 
use of technology experts in many cases. Deepfake detectors may be 
costly, requiring computer forensics or other expert analysis. Further, 
while detecting deepfakes through technology is certainly possible, it is 
imperfect, especially as deepfake technology continues to advance.105 A 
blanket requirement for forensic expert testimony would unnecessarily 
increase the cost of litigation. The struggle thus becomes finding  
cost-effective tools for weeding out deepfakes while maintaining rigor 
in gauging authentication, veracity, and balancing the video image’s 
relevance with its unfair prejudice.  
The solution may thus lie in a middle-ground approach that 
redefines the quantity and quality of circumstantial evidence necessary 
for a reasonable jury to determine authenticity in the age of deepfakes. 
Some courts have noted that social media evidence contains an inherent 
risk of falsification.106 Now, more than ever, the risk of convincing fakes 
is on the rise with the democratization of deepfakes. Simply relying on 
basic human perception no longer suffices with this new genre of 
falsehoods. Perhaps this is best illustrated with aural evidence. The 
current version of Rule 901 contemplates lay opinion identifying a  
voice as the alleged speaker, without taking into account the reality 
that current deepfake technology can accurately simulate a speaker’s 
voice.107 Even an individual familiar with another person’s voice can be 
easily fooled by a deepfake audio clip. Thus, it is important that other 
circumstantial evidence is presented to authenticate some audio clips 
to allow a reasonable jury to determine admissibility. 
Under this middle-ground approach, circumstantial evidence 
should provide particular context of how a video or image originated, 
 
 105. See Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, 21st Century-Style Truth Decay: Deep 
Fakes and the Challenge for Privacy, Free Expression, and National Security, 78 MD. L. REV. 882, 
889 (2019) (describing how technologists cannot solve all of our deepfake-related problems); Nina 
I. Brown, Deepfakes and the Weaponization of Disinformation, 23 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 57–58  
(2020) (noting that some sort of flagging technology could be developed to detect deepfakes but 
would be an incomplete fix without greater media literacy, platform social responsibility, and other 
solutions); Chesney & Citron, supra note 28, at 1787–88 (noting how PhotoDNA or similar  
technology for deepfake detection is underdeveloped and may not be a feasible solution to the  
prevalence of deepfakes more broadly); Russell Spivak, “Deepfakes”: The Newest Way to Commit 
One of the Oldest Crimes, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 339, 353–55 (2019) (describing how the private 
sector can help counter deepfakes). 
 106. See State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (noting how easy it is to 
fake social media content due to lack of security on platforms). 
 107. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5).  
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who it purports to depict, and what features of the video or  
image support authenticity—without necessarily requiring computer 
forensics and analysis in every case. Testimony of those with knowledge 
may become even more important. But judges will need to assume a 
strong gatekeeping role to ensure that the quantum of circumstantial 
evidence is sufficient for a jury to make a more nuanced decision about 
authenticity in the age of deepfakes.108 A special jury instruction about 
visual and audio clues for detecting deepfakes may be helpful in some 
situations.109 A middle-ground approach should promote fairness and 
efficiency without creating too high a bar in most cases. Fortunately, 
the Federal Rules of Evidence already contemplate balancing 
competing concerns to arrive at the truth and, with appropriate 
standards for authenticity, potential deepfakes will be less likely to 
 
 108. See generally FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating that the court has the responsibility to  
decide any preliminary questions regarding the admissibility of evidence).  
 109. Juries are often instructed on how to gauge the credibility of witnesses. For example, 
the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit uses a model jury instruction that states:  
In deciding what the facts are, you may have to decide what testimony you believe and 
what testimony you do not believe. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the  
witnesses. “Credibility” means whether a witness is worthy of belief. You may believe 
everything a witness says or only part of it or none of it. In deciding what to believe, 
you may consider a number of factors, including the following: 
(1) the opportunity and ability of the witness to see or hear or know the things the 
witness testifies to; 
(2) the quality of the witness’s understanding and memory; 
(3) the witness’s manner while testifying; 
(4) whether the witness has an interest in the outcome of the case or any motive, 
bias or prejudice; 
(5) whether the witness is contradicted by anything the witness said or wrote  
before trial or by other evidence; 
(6) how reasonable the witness’s testimony is when considered in the light of other 
evidence that you believe; and 
(7) any other factors that bear on believability. 
[The weight of the evidence to prove a fact does not necessarily depend on the number 
of witnesses who testify. What is more important is how believable the witnesses were, 
and how much weight you think their testimony deserves.]  
COMM. ON MODEL CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, THIRD CIR., MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § Ch. 
1.7 (2018). For videos, images, and audio evidence that needs to be authenticated with  
circumstantial evidence, the court may opt to include a special jury instruction that explains some 
criteria that the jurors can use to determine if they believe the evidence purports to be what it 
claims it is. See Agnes E. Venema & Zeno J. Geradts, Digital Forensics, Deepfakes, and the Legal 
Process, 16 SCITECH LAW. 14, 17 (2020). Aspects like lighting, blinking, and editing clues can be 
included as factors. See Caldera, supra note 104 (explaining some of the subtle ways deepfake 
content can be used, like lack of blinking by the subject, but noting that the technology will make 
it even harder to rely on visual clues in the future). Unfortunately, a jury instruction about ways 
to spot deepfakes may become obsolete as technology advances. But some sort of detailed guidance 
for the jury on gauging authenticity may be warranted, at least as a short-term solution. 
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corrupt the litigation process. This middle-ground approach balances 
emerging evidentiary needs in the era of deepfakes; it elevates the 
traditional standard above a basic, flexible approach, which will fail to 
protect the court against the threat of deepfakes in litigation, while also 
avoiding an unduly high bar. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Deepfake technology has created new challenges in litigation, 
particularly as to authentication of video and audio evidence. While 
some courts impose a higher bar for admitting social media evidence, 
others take a flexible approach that applies the existing Federal Rules 
of Evidence with little or no modification to account for the ease with 
which false information is created and shared on social media. Now, 
with the advent of deepfakes, a more rigorous approach to authenticity 
will be necessary. 
This Article suggests that a middle-ground approach that  
rests between the current Maryland and Texas standards. This 
approach would recognize that deepfakes pose unique challenges to  
the truth-seeking aim of the Federal Rules of Evidence. While an  
across-the-board heightened standard of authentication for digital 
evidence is not warranted, a higher bar may be required in some  
cases. A middle-ground approach would mandate that sufficient 
circumstantial evidence—both as to quantum and quality—be 
presented to the jury whenever the jury is asked to ascertain the 
authenticity of digital video and audio evidence. By requiring this 
middle-ground approach, the Federal Rules of Evidence can ensure 
jurors have sufficient evidence to gauge the authenticity of increasingly 
convincing deepfakes that threaten to undermine the justice system.  
 
